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Abstract: Longer lives and fertility far below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman are 
leading to rapid population aging in many countries.  Many observers are concerned that aging 
will adversely affect public finances and standards of living. Analysis of newly available 
National Transfer Accounts data for 40 countries shows that fertility well above replacement 
would typically be most beneficial for government budgets. However, fertility near replacement 
would be most beneficial for standards of living when the analysis includes the effects of age 
structure on families as well as governments.  And fertility below replacement would maximize 
per capita consumption when the cost of providing capital for a growing labor force is taken into 
account. While low fertility will indeed challenge government programs and very low fertility 
undermines living standards, we find that moderately low fertility and population decline favor 
the broader material standard of living. 
 
 
One Sentence Summary: Low fertility will indeed challenge government programs in most 
countries, but viewed more broadly economic concerns about low fertility and population decline 
appear exaggerated. 
Main Text: Economic behavior, abilities, and needs vary strongly over the human life cycle. 
During childhood and old age, we consume more than we produce through our labor.  The gap is 
made up in part by relying on accumulated assets. It is also made up through intergenerational 
transfers, both public and private, that shift of resources from some generations to others with no 
expectation of direct repayment. Private transfers occur when parents rear their children and 
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when older people assist their adult children or alternatively receive assistance from them. Public 
transfers include public education, publicly funded health care, public pensions, and the taxes to 
pay for these programs. Because of these economic interdependencies across age, fertility rates 
that are falling or already low will drive rapid population aging in economies around the world. 
Forty-two percent of the world’s people live in countries where the total fertility rate (TFR) is 
below replacement, about 2.1 births per woman. The TFR is 1.5 births per woman in Europe and 
1.4 births per woman in Japan (1). With fertility this low, population growth will give way to 
population decline and population aging will be rapid.  The median age of the Southern 
European population, for example, is projected to reach 50 years of age by 2040 as compared to 
41 in 2010 and 27 in 1950 (1).  In 2013, governments in 102 countries reported that population 
aging was a “major concern” and 54 countries had enacted policies intended to raise fertility (2).  
This is a remarkable reversal from decades of concern about the economic and environmental 
consequences of high fertility, rapid population growth (3). Should we now be alarmed about 
low fertility, population decline, and population aging?  Should governments encourage their 
citizens to bear more children to balance the dramatic future increase in the number and 
proportion of elderly? 
Identifying an optimal population policy is likely to be impossible for several reasons.  First, 
children yield direct satisfaction and impose costs on parents that are difficult or impossible to 
measure. Second, the environmental consequences of continuing population growth are 
exceedingly complex and difficult to value or weigh against other costs and benefits of low 
fertility.  Third, assessing the welfare consequences of differences in fertility requires comparing 
the welfare of those not yet born to those who will never be born.  
Here our goal is more modest: to examine how low fertility and population aging will influence 
the material standard of living. The analysis shows, first, that relatively high fertility and young 
populations are favorable to public finances in rich countries because they have comprehensive 
systems of support for the elderly.  A broader analysis that incorporates private intergenerational 
transfers and the capital costs of equipping each new generation shows that low fertility, older 
populations, and gradual population decline favor the material standard of living.   
The implications of low fertility and population aging depend on the age patterns of labor 
income, consumption, and intergenerational transfers (4-8).  Estimates of economic life cycles 
and intergenerational transfers have not previously been available, however. The results 
presented here are based on estimates constructed by research teams in 40 countries following a 
common methodology, National Transfer Accounts (NTA) (9-11). NTA uses existing surveys, 
administrative data, and the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) to estimate the 
values of goods and services produced and consumed at each age and the intergenerational flows 
across ages through public and private transfers and assets. NTA incorporates the age dimension 
into SNA, thereby facilitating analysis of the macroeconomic implications of population change.  
Estimated labor income by age includes wages, salaries and fringe benefits as well as an estimate 
of the value of labor of those who are self-employed or unpaid family workers, all averaged 
across the entire population at each age. Consumption includes private expenditures and goods 
and services produced by governments (e.g., education and health care) imputed to different ages 
and averaged across all individuals at a given age.  
NTA age profiles for the US and Thailand illustrate the data used in the analysis (Figure 1).  In 
the US, elderly consume far more than young adults and labor income falls off rapidly at older 
ages (A).  Public transfer inflows to the elderly are generous, funded largely through public 
transfer outflows from the working ages (B).  Familial transfers are important to some elderly, 
but on average the elderly give more than they receive at almost every age (C).  In Thailand, 
elderly and young adults consume at similar levels. The elderly have somewhat higher labor 
income than in the US (D). The public system for the elderly is very modest with public transfer 
outflows from the elderly as great as public transfer inflows (E).  Familial support is very 
important for the elderly with private transfer inflows higher than private transfer outflows (F). 
The striking differences in shapes of labor income and consumption by age, and in public and 
private transfers made and received, lead to differences in the impacts population age 
distributions in the forty countries studied here.  These differences are incorporated into two 
summary measures, the fiscal support ratio (FSR) and the support ratio (SR). Definitions are 
given below, but heuristically, the FSR is the ratio of tax payers to beneficiaries and the SR is the 
ratio of earners to consumers. Age profiles, FSR, and SR for all countries and complete 
definitions of variables are provided in the supplementary materials (9) (Box 1). 
The fiscal support ratio (FSR) summarizes the influence of population age distribution on 
government budgets. The FSR is defined as the number of effective taxpayers, calculated by 
weighting the population in each age group by the average taxes paid by that age group in the 
base year, divided by the number of effective beneficiaries, calculated by weighting the 
population in each age group by per capita benefits received.  A higher FSR is favorable for 
public finances allowing higher benefits at each age or lower taxes at each age or a smaller 
budget deficit or some combination of the three.  A population concentrated in high tax-paying 
ages leads to a high FSR.  A population with many children, who pay little in taxes and receive 
education benefits, leads to a low FSR.  Likewise, a population at older ages has a low FSR in 
rich countries, because they emphasize pensions and health care spending on the elderly.   
The support ratio (SR) summarizes the effect of the population age distribution on income and 
outlays per person combining both the public and the private sectors.  The SR is defined as the 
number of effective workers, the population weighted by per capita labor income at each age, 
divided by the number of effective consumers, the population weighted by per capita 
consumption at each age. A higher SR indicates proportionally higher resources available per 
person allowing for higher consumption, higher saving and investment, or some combination of 
the two. A population concentrated at ages where labor income is high and consumption is low 
leads to a high SR.  A population concentrated at ages where labor income is low and 
consumption is high leads to a low SR.   
The FSR and the SR provide distinctive perspectives because intergenerational transfers through 
the public and private sectors are very different.  Especially in rich countries, public transfers are 
predominantly to the elderly, while private transfers go mostly to children.  As a consequence, 
the age structure that favors public finances is much younger than the age structure that favors 
the combined finances of the public and private sectors.  Both a young, high fertility, rapidly 
growing population and an old, low fertility, rapidly declining population reduce the FSR and the 
SR.  The central issue addressed here is what demographic conditions would be most favorable 
to public finances and standards of living in the long run. 
The age structure of a population in the long run is determined by fertility, mortality, and 
migration.  Our analysis emphasizes fertility because it is an important determinant of age 
structure and because so many governments are encouraging higher fertility due to their concerns 
about population aging.  Mortality decline also leads to older populations but the effects are 
gradual and no government has ever proposed slowing mortality decline to avoid population 
aging. Immigration is often suggested to help reduce the population aging that results from low 
fertility. Immigration does lead to a younger population in the short-term, but it has a muted 
effect in the long-term. Immigrants are relatively young on average when they arrive, but over 
time their age distribution tends to become similar to or older than the age distribution of the 
receiving population. This occurs because the immigrant populations age and because immigrant 
fertility rates typically converge towards the fertility rates of the receiving population (12-14). A 
summary of the literature concludes “a steady stream of migrants almost always makes a 
population younger in the short-term but older in the long-term” (13). Net immigration also 
raises the population growth rate which imposes capital costs, discussed below, that must be 
balanced against possible benefits from age structure.  
Thus, we consider the effect of fertility given the level of mortality in a population closed to 
migration.  Given mortality and in the absence of migration, the population growth rate is 
determined by fertility. What level of fertility and population growth rate would maximize the 
FSR and SR in the long run?  
Given the NTA age profiles we can easily find this level of fertility or growth rate by systematic 
numerical search. To gain analytic insight we can also differentiate the log of the support ratio 
(ln SR) with respect to the population growth rate (n), finding that ln
c ylSR n A A∂ ∂ = − . (See 
supplemental materials.) Here cA  is the average age of consuming in the population and lyA is the 
average age of earning. The differentiation is across long run age distributions with differing 
growth rates (steady state age distributions or stable population age distributions). When 
c ylA A>  then earning occurs at a younger age than consumption, on average, so a younger 
population, achieved through higher fertility and more rapid population growth, would raise 
effective workers more than effective consumers, thereby raising the SR, and conversely. At the 
maximum long run SR these average ages are equal and the derivative equals zero (5).  
The support ratio is an intuitive and widely used indicator, but it has a serious limitation.  
Although higher fertility might push the support ratio higher this could come at a cost – the 
increased saving and investment that would be required to provide capital for the growing labor 
force (5-8, 12-14).  This “capital cost” of higher fertility and additional population growth 
depends on the behavioral responses of households and firms and on public policies that 
influence saving and investment, e.g., the extent of unfunded public pensions and health care.  
To deal with the uncertainty about future public policy, we consider two scenarios that in our 
view encompass the possible responses.   
In one approach, the low capital cost case, we assume that the ratio of capital to output is 
constant and unaffected by changing demography.  In the face of fertility decline, policies are 
implemented as needed to reduce saving rates to achieve this outcome.  This case would be 
optimal for one variant of a well-known economic growth model (9, 18-19).  Between 1980 and 
2004, the capital-output ratio was very stable for many OECD countries including the US, with 
about three dollars of capital for each dollar of output produced (20).  We use the average value 
of 3.0 to represent the low capital cost case.   
For the second case, the high capital cost case, we rely on the most widely used model of 
economic growth, the neo-classical model.  We will use an important, special case of this model 
in which policies are used to achieve the saving rate that leads to the economic growth path with 
the highest possible consumption per capita, called “golden rule” growth by economists.  Under 
these conditions, capital per worker rises when fertility falls as has been true in Japan, many 
OECD countries, and recently many other high income countries (21).  Under the high capital 
cost scenario, the capital-output ratio rises to higher levels than currently found in any country.  
The increase in capital due to low fertility is consistent with the view recently advanced by 
Piketty (22).  
Again, the fertility rate that maximizes per capita consumption incorporating capital costs can be 
found by numerical search.  For either of the cases, we can also differentiate across steady states, 
finding that the first order condition for maximum consumption is: 
( )ln lifetime consumption
lc y
d dn A A K C= − −    where K is capital and C is consumption.  
The support ratio effect is captured by 
lc y
A A− while K C−  captures the capital costs of higher 
fertility or more rapid population growth (9).    
Table 1 reports the key results for 40 countries comparing each country’s current fertility 
(column B) with the fertility rate that maximizes the FSR (column C), the SR (column D), and 
per capita consumption for the low and high capital cost scenarios (columns E and F).  Very low 
fertility does not adversely affect public finances in lower income countries because public 
programs for the elderly are quite limited and the elderly do pay taxes.  For every high and 
upper-middle income country except South Africa and Thailand, current fertility is below the 
fertility level that maximizes the FSR – 3.0 and 2.9 births per woman, respectively, for upper-
middle and high income countries. We expect that public transfer programs will become more 
generous in countries that have not yet embraced them, so that higher TFRs will maximize their 
FSRs in the future.  At the same time future pension and health care reform in rich industrial 
nations and many Latin American countries may well reduce the TFRs that maximize their 
FSRs.   
The TFR that would maximize the support ratio (column D) is 1.8 births per woman in lower 
income countries, 2.0 in upper-middle income countries, and 2.3 in high income countries.  
These values are lower than the FSR-maximizing values because families bear most of the costs 
of childrearing while governments, except in lower income countries, are typically burdened 
more by the elderly.  Still, one-third of the upper-middle income countries and all high income 
countries except Uruguay currently have fertility below the level that maximizes the support 
ratio.  For high income countries, 2.3 births per woman would be “best”, on average, as 
compared with a current value of 1.6 births per woman.  Judged in this limited way, high income 
countries would benefit from higher fertility.   
The fertility rates that would maximize consumption, taking capital cost into account, are 
reported in columns E (low capital cost scenario) and F (high capital cost scenario).  Using either 
of these measures, current fertility is higher than the consumption maximizing level in every 
lower income country except Vietnam and every upper-middle income country except China, 
Hungary, and Thailand.  In all of these countries, fertility is too low using the low capital cost 
scenario, and too high using the high capital cost scenario. However, we emphatically are not 
suggesting that these lower income countries should be aiming for fertility as low as shown in 
Table 1.  Development will likely lead to consumption and public support age profiles similar to 
those of richer countries. 
The picture is mixed for the higher income countries.  Consider the nine countries with TFRs 
above 1.6 births per woman in 2005-10 (Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Sweden, UK, 
US, and Uruguay).  In these countries, the TFR exceeds or is very close to the consumption-
maximizing fertility level.  Under any plausible assumption about the capital costs of higher 
fertility, these nine countries did not have fertility rates that were too low.  For seven countries 
with TFRs ranging from 1.2 to 1.5 for 2005-10 (Austria, Germany, Japan, Slovenia, South 
Korea, Spain, and Taiwan), higher fertility rates would result in higher consumption under any 
plausible scenario.  For only one high-income country, Italy, is a definitive conclusion not 
possible.  
Very low fertility results in lower living standards.  Given current mortality rates, no 
immigration, and age profiles of high income countries, a population growth rate (n) of -2% per 
year ( 1.1TFR  ) would reduce per capita consumption by 4 percent relative to consumption for 
n=0 and TFR at replacement.  Low fertility produces a smaller decline in consumption in lower 
and upper-middle income countries because elder consumption is not as high and because these 
countries have higher mortality rates (Figure 2, A).  Given Japanese mortality rates, lost 
consumption would be greater for all income groups but especially for high-income countries – a 
7.6% decline compared with consumption at replacement fertility (Figure 2, B).  These costs of 
low fertility would be smaller for the high capital cost scenario.  
The effects of having low fertility in 2005-10 unfold gradually as the lower stable SR is reached.  
Among the high income countries with TFRs of 1.6 or higher, the stable SRs are about 10% less 
than the 2010 SRs.   For high income countries with TFRs below 1.6, the stable SR is 80% of its 
2010 level. For these, South Korea excluded, between 50 and 75% of the decline toward the 
stable SR would occur by 2030 (9)  
Based on Japan, with the oldest population in the world, the effects of low fertility highlighted in 
this study are already beginning to emerge (9).  Due to low fertility and long life the population 
is aging rapidly and the support ratio fell at .6% annually during the last decade while the fiscal 
support ratio fell even faster at .9%. However, slower and now negative labor force growth has 
led to reduced capital costs of equipping the new workers. Even with lower saving rates 2000-
2007 (the start of the global recession) the capital output ratio has risen and, remarkably, 
consumption per capita also rose at more than 2% annually. It seems possible through 
developments in robotics that capital will be able to substitute for labor in elder care. It remains 
true, however, that a TFR of 1.34 (the average for 2005-2010) will impose considerable strain on 
public finances. Public debt is very high in Japan, making higher taxes and lower benefits a near 
certainty. But Japan is not experiencing economic decline and standards of living continue to 
increase at favorable rates for an advanced economy – faster than long-term productivity growth. 
Many factors will influence the economic effects of low fertility that are not part of the formal 
model used in the analysis.  These additional considerations, however, reinforce the basic 
conclusion that low fertility is not a serious economic challenge.  The effect of low fertility on 
the number of workers and taxpayers has been offset by greater human capital investment, 
enhancing the productivity of workers (23). Targeted immigration policy might be helpful, 
although we are somewhat skeptical on this point (9).  International capital flows, trade, and 
technological innovation may mitigate some adverse effects of population aging.  Behavioral 
responses are likely: changes in patterns of work and consumption are already occurring.  
Governments are scaling back systems that are not sustainable given any likely demographic 
scenario.  
Fiscal pressures on public programs due to population aging are real and important. If the sub-
replacement fertility levels found in many countries persist, adjustments in public programs and 
retirement age will be required.  The US is exceptional with a TFR close to the level best for 
public finances.  In a number of countries, particularly those with very low fertility, standards of 
living would be moderately higher if fertility increased.  Fertility as low as 1.6 births per woman 
and possibly even lower should not be a matter of concern.  Fertility below replacement and 
modest population decline favor higher material standards of living.   
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Fig. 1. Per capita age profiles of consumption, labor income, and public and private transfers for the US (2009) (A, 
B, C) and Thailand (2004) (D, E, F).  Profiles are expressed relative to the mean labor income of persons 30-49 in 
each country.  
 
Fig 2. Effect of population growth on consumption per equivalent adult as a percentage of consumption level for 
zero population growth.  Based on the low capital cost case assuming that the saving rate adjusts to keep the capital-
output ratio constant at 3.0 given own-country mortality rates (A) and 2009 Japanese mortality rates (B). Values are 
simple averages for countries in three groups:  lower income, upper-middle income, and high income countries.  See 
Table 1 for countries in each group.  Sources:  National Transfer Accounts (ntaccounts.org) for consumption and 
labor income profiles; UN (2013) World Population Prospects 2012 for age specific mortality rates except for age-
specific survival rates for Japan in 2009 taken from the Human Mortality Database http://www.mortality.org/ 
accessed October 16, 2013.  
  
 Variable Definition and sources Range (mean)  
Fiscal support 
ratio (FSR) 
Number of effective taxpayers per effective beneficiary determined by 
the population age distribution (WPP) and the age profiles of per capita 
taxes paid and benefits received for all in-kind and cash transfer 
programs, including education, health care, and pensions (NTA).  All 
values expressed relative to the FSR for 2010. 
0.70 to 1.09 
(0.88) 
Mean age of 
consumption  
( CA ) 
Average age at which goods and services are being consumed.  This is 
determined by the age distribution of the population (WPP) and the age 
profile of per capita consumption (NTA).    
28.0 to 56.9 
(44.5) 
 
Mean age of 
earning ( ylA ) 
Average age at which goods and services are being produced by 
workers.  This is determined by the age distribution of the population 
(WPP) and the age profile of per capita labor income (NTA).    
35.2 to 47.4 
(42.8) 
 
Support ratio (SR) Number of effective producers per effective consumer determined by 
the population age distribution (WPP) and the age profiles of per capita 
consumption and labor income (NTA).   
0.36 to 0.67 
(0.49) 
Total fertility rate 
(TFR) 
Number of births per woman over the reproductive span, given current 
age-specific birth rates (WPP).   
1.1 to 5.6 
(2.2) 
 
Box 1. Key aging variables, definition, method of calculation, summary statistics, and sources (WPP is World 
Population Prospects 2012 Revision; NTA is National Transfer Accounts (www.ntaccounts.org, accessed July 10, 
2013. )  The range and mean values, except those for the TFR, are the stable values that would result if current age-
specific fertility and mortality rates persist.  See supplementary materials for detailed method of calculation. 
 
  
 Table 1.  Current total fertility rates (TFR) and TFRs that maximize alternative objectives. 
Country/Income group 
Total 
fertility 
rate 
2005-10 
(B) 
TFR that maximizes each outcome 
Fiscal 
support 
ratio (C) 
Support 
ratio (D) 
Consumption, 
low capital 
cost scenario 
(E) 
Consumption, 
high capital 
cost scenario 
(F) 
All Countries 2.44 2.56 2.05 1.54 1.24 
Lower income 4.03 1.08 1.75 1.21 0.91 
Cambodia 3.08 na 3.66 2.67 2.19 
Ethiopia 5.26 na 1.40 0.91 0.62 
Ghana 4.22 na 1.01 0.67 0.46 
India 2.66 1.80 1.93 1.40 1.06 
Indonesia 2.50 0.88 1.28 0.84 0.53 
Kenya 4.80 1.12 2.07 1.54 1.26 
Mozambique 5.57 1.30 1.61 1.12 0.89 
Nigeria 6.00 na 0.96 0.54 0.29 
Philippines 3.27 1.13 1.43 1.00 0.73 
Senegal 5.11 0.25 1.32 0.67 0.28 
Vietnam 1.89 na 2.60 1.99 1.67 
Upper-middle income 2.09 2.96 2.01 1.51 1.20 
Argentina 2.25 3.25 2.00 1.54 1.26 
Brazil 1.90 5.45 2.29 1.82 1.50 
China 1.63 2.64 2.17 1.65 1.34 
Colombia 2.45 3.77 2.04 1.49 1.13 
Costa Rica 1.92 3.85 2.31 1.77 1.42 
Hungary 1.33 2.58 1.89 1.47 1.21 
Jamaica 2.40 na 2.19 1.63 1.30 
Mexico 2.37 2.83 1.98 1.47 1.14 
Peru 2.60 3.45 2.17 1.61 1.26 
South Africa 2.55 0.97 1.40 1.02 0.82 
Thailand 1.49 0.79 2.00 1.55 1.28 
Turkey 2.16 na 1.63 1.08 0.71 
High income 1.65 2.94 2.27 1.78 1.48 
Australia 1.89 na 2.70 2.06 1.70 
Austria 1.40 3.74 2.44 1.90 1.58 
Canada 1.63 na 1.96 1.55 1.26 
Chile 1.90 3.63 2.20 1.69 1.36 
Finland 1.84 2.92 2.30 1.83 1.54 
France 1.97 na 2.41 1.92 1.61 
Germany 1.36 3.33 2.55 2.00 1.65 
Italy 1.38 na 2.11 1.65 1.34 
Japan 1.34 2.70 2.33 1.88 1.57 
Slovenia 1.44 3.25 2.21 1.78 1.52 
South Korea 1.23 2.07 2.04 1.55 1.25 
Spain 1.41 3.29 2.20 1.73 1.43 
Sweden 1.89 3.07 2.15 1.76 1.49 
Taiwan 1.26 1.85 2.15 1.70 1.43 
United Kingdom 1.88 3.00 2.63 2.03 1.68 
United States 2.06 2.16 2.33 1.84 1.50 
Uruguay 2.12 3.22 1.90 1.47 1.19 
Sources.  Current TFR are most recent estimates from the United Nations Population 
Division (1) and refer to the period of 2005-2010. All other values calculated by authors using 
methods described in detail in the supplemental material.  Income group based on World 
Bank classification for 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups)3; 
lower income includes low-income and lower middle-income countries. 
Notes:  Results are calculated using the age-profiles of economic flows estimated for each 
country, a depreciation rate of 5 percent per year, and exogenous labor-augmenting 
technological growth of 2 percent per year. 
 
 
  
Fig. 1. Per capita age profiles of consumption, labor income, and public and private transfers for the US (2009) and 
Thailand (2004).  Profiles are expressed relative to the mean labor income of persons 30-49 in each country.  
(A) In the US, elderly consume far more than young 
adults and labor income falls off rapidly at older ages.  
(B) Public transfers inflows to the elderly are generous, 
funded largely through public transfer outflows from the 
working ages.  (C) Familial transfers are important to 
some elderly, but on average the elderly give more than 
they receive at almost every age.   
  
(D) In Thailand, elderly and young adults consume at 
similar levels. The elderly have somewhat higher labor 
income than in the US.  (E) The public system for the 
elderly is very modest with public transfer outflows 
from the elderly as great as public transfer inflows.  (F) 
Familial support is very important for the elderly with 
private transfer inflows higher than private transfer 
outflows. 
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Figure 2. The percentage gain or loss in consumption relative to consumption for zero population growth and 
replacement fertility, assuming that the saving rate adjusts to keep the capital-output ratio constant at 3.0. Values are 
simple averages for countries in three groups:  low and lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high-
income countries.  See Table 1 for countries in each group.  The steady state population growth rates shown on the 
horizontal axis in the upper panel apply to both panels.  The total fertility rate corresponds to the steady state 
population growth rate assuming Japan 2009 mortality rates.  For lower income countries with higher mortality rates 
shown in the upper panel the total fertility rates are somewhat higher.  (A) In high income countries, deviations from 
zero population growth or the consumption maximizing rate of growth have a relatively modest effect on per capita 
consumption.  Population decline of 1 percent per year (a TFR of about 1.5) has a negligible effect on consumption.  
For middle income and lower income countries, fertility must drop to very low levels to have a substantial effect on 
consumption.  (B) The lower panel calculates the relationship between consumption and fertility using Japanese 
mortality rates.  Again this shows that only very low fertility has adverse consequences for consumption.  Sources:  
National Transfer Accounts (ntaccounts.org) for consumption and labor income profiles; UN (2013) World 
Population Prospects 2012 for age specific mortality rates except for age-specific survival rates for Japan in 2009 
taken from the Human Mortality Database http://www.mortality.org/ accessed October 16, 2013.   
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